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What was Known in the Neutral Countries about  
the On-Going Genocide of European Jews?
This essay seeks to understand, from a comparative perspective, when and 
through what channels countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Por-
tugal and Turkey learned that the Third Reich was implementing its policy 
of annihilating the Jews of Europe. The neutral and allied countries were 
well informed about antisemitic persecution conducted by the Nazi regime 
from its very beginning. Even in countries where censorship existed, news-
papers published reports about the growing antisemitism in Germany. 
From late autumn 1941, Germany’s goal was to exterminate all the Jews 
on the continent. Yet it was a long time before this was understood by the 
Allies and the neutral states. It is important to keep in mind that no histori-
cal precedent existed. A genocide of such magnitude in the heart of Europe 
was simply inconceivable and, as Deborah Lipstadt puts it, “beyond belief.”1 
Furthermore, as Yehuda Bauer and Walter Laqueur maintain, there is a 
distinction between “information” and “knowledge,”2 between “knowing” 
and “believing.”3 More than a year and a half passed after the mass murder 
had begun, with the invasion of the Soviet Union, until the release of the 
Allied Joint Declaration of December, 1942.
Only after May—June 1942, in the face of a flood of reports that served 
to confirm the crimes committed by the Germans against the Jews, did 
a campaign start that was to “attract public attention to the crimes in 
Poland.”4
1 D. Lipstadt. Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 
1933–1945. New York: Free Press, 1986.
2 Y. Bauer. Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 218.
3 W. Laqueur. The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s ‘Final Solu-
tion. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. 3.
4 D. Stola. “Early News of the Holocaust from Poland,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 11, No. 1 (1997): 5–7.
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In June 1942, the arrival of information intensified. That month, the 
report of the Bund—originally the “General Jewish Labor Bund of Lithua-
nia, Poland and Russia”, (an important Jewish organization in Poland that 
continued to operated clandestinely in the occupied territories during 
the war), found its way to London and Washington. On 9 June, Wladislav 
Sikorski, the prime minister of the Polish government-in-exile in London, 
gave a speech in which he referred to the shootings, the forced transporta-
tion of Polish men and women and the Nazis’ objective of exterminating 
all the Jews. On 29 June, the British section of the World Jewish Congress 
organized a press conference at which Ignacy Schwarzbart, a Jewish repre-
sentative on the National Council of the Polish government-in-exile, stated 
that a million Jews had already been murdered. On 8 July, 1942, the Polish 
National Council issued a resolution that spoke of plans to eliminate all 
the Jews.
However, these first alarms about mass extermination were not gener-
ally believed. There was a widespread belief that both the Poles and the Jew-
ish organizations were exaggerating, because, among other reasons, during 
World War I, British propaganda had spread extensive rumors about the 
Germans, most of which were later discredited. The “campaign” contin-
ued and, in November 1942, the Jewish Agency executive issued an offi-
cial statement confirming the extermination of Jews in Europe. That same 
month, Jan Karski, who worked as a courier for the Polish government-in-
exile, arrived in London and delivered a report. On 10 December, the Poles 
sent a diplomatic memo to the governments of the United Nations. This 
document dealt exclusively with the extermination of the Jews, making it 
“a visible exception” to the tendency of seeing this practice as ‘just another’ 
Nazi atrocity committed in Poland. Then, on 17 December, 1942, the Allied 
Powers issued a public statement that denounced and condemned “the bes-
tial policy of cold-blooded extermination” of the Jews. 
The Joint Declaration on the Persecution of the Jews from 17 Decem-
ber, 1942, in which the eleven Allied governments presented their common 
position, stated explicitly that the German authorities were engaging in the 
mass murder of European Jews and that those responsible for this “bestial 
policy of cold-blooded extermination” would “not escape retribution.”
However, the existence of an extermination camp with details about 
the gas chambers was revealed only in the spring of 1944, following the 
escape of prisoners from Auschwitz-Birkenau. The Polish government-
in-exile also played a leading role in informing the neutral countries. Its 
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Information pamphlet by the Polish government-in-exile containing several documents 
that provide evidence of the ongoing extermination of Jews by the Germans, published 
and disseminated in January 1943. 
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representatives were in contact with neutral diplomats in London.5 On 11 
September, 1942, Polish Foreign Minister Edward Raczynski informed the 
neutral countries that a large number of Polish Jews, who had been liv-
ing in unoccupied France, had been deported to the Reich.6 Later, between 
December 1942 and January 1943, a pamphlet entitled “The Mass Exter-
mination of Jews in German Occupied Poland,” published on behalf of the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reached the neutral capitals.7
In addition to the information provided by the government-in-exile 
and Jewish organizations, each neutral country had its own sources of 
information. Countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal 
were in a better situation than the Allies to receive information because 
they kept their diplomatic representations open in the Reich and other Axis 
countries during the war. Thus, their citizens, journalists, military person-
nel, businessmen, etc., could travel to Germany and the occupied territo-
ries. They even sent military and medical missions to the Eastern Front. 
Spain, for example, sent a division of (alleged) volunteers (the Blue Divi-
sion). Furthermore, it was through these countries that many Jews, fleeing 
Hitler and the Holocaust, could escape, bringing with them descriptions 
of the persecution they had endured. The governments and diplomats of 
the neutral countries, however, were also unable to fully comprehend the 
dimensions of the Nazi extermination plans.
Switzerland8
Of all the neutral countries, Switzerland was best positioned to receive 
news. Its territory was an important link in the Polish intelligence network, 
whose couriers managed to deliver messages there that were then sent on 
5 AHDMNE (Historical and Diplomatic Archives of the Portuguese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Lisbon, hereafter AHDMNE), 2.º P., A.49, M. 96, Note Verbale. 
18.6.1942.
6 D. Engel. “The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Deportation of Polish Jews 
from France in 1942.” Yad Vashem Studies 15 (1983): 15–16.
7 AHDMNE, Lisbon, 2.º P., A.49, M. 96, Official letter from the Polish Minister to 
António de Oliveira Salazar. 15.1.1943.
8 The author thanks R. Fivaz-Silbermann for help regarding the case of Switzerland.
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to London.9 One such message was a report sent by the Swiss minister in 
Rome, after a conversation with Cardinal Maglione, to Marcel Pilet-Golaz, 
head of the Swiss Foreign Ministry. In it he spoke of the “biological exter-
mination of a large part of the population in the occupied regions.”
Swiss consuls sent back reports about the deportation of Jews, espe-
cially Franz von Weiss, the Swiss consul in Cologne. In November 1941, von 
Weiss wrote to the Swiss minister in Berlin, informing him that, accord-
ing to information provided by an important German industrialist, Jews 
were starving to death in the ghettos of Warsaw and Lodz. The legation for-
warded the document to Berne, but Pilet-Golaz considered it confidential, 
meaning it should not circulate within the Foreign Ministry.10
Eye-witness accounts from several Swiss citizens who had travelled to 
the East, including some on medical missions, and who had been present 
at executions of Jews carried out by the Einsatzgruppen (Mobile Killing 
Units) also came to the attention of Swiss diplomats. 
One such account was by Rudolf Bucher, a doctor, who was in the 
region of Smolensk and Minsk in October 1941 and who, on his return to 
Switzerland in January 1942, tried to make this information public. The 
army’s intelligence service also interrogated deserters and some former 
combatants in Russia, who spoke about the massacres of Jews committed 
by the Einsatzgruppen. Thanks to the accumulation of information, espe-
cially that provided by the Polish legation in Berne, in September 1943, 
Heinrich Rothmund, the Swiss police chief, for the first time was able to 
distinguish the differences between concentration camps and extermina-
tion camps.11
Did Swiss authorities understand that the Third Reich had imple-
mented a policy of annihilation of European Jewry? Most likely they had 
information about such an objective, but not the knowledge to understand 
it. In July 1942, in a report requested by Heinrich Rothmund, his deputy 
Robert Jezler noted that, “the consistent and reliable reports about how the 
deportations are being carried out and the conditions in the Jewish quar-
9 W. Laqueur. The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s ‘Final Solu-
tion’. Boston: 1980. 41–42; C. Ludwig. Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Schweiz seit 1933 
bis zur Gegenwart. Bern: Lang, 1957. 
10 M. Cerutti. “La Suisse, terre d’asile?.” Revue d’Histoire de la SHOAH – Le monde 
juif, No. 163 (1998): 33.
11 M. Cerutti. “La Suisse, terre d’asile?” 36.
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ters in the east are so awful that one cannot help but understand the desper-
ate attempts made by the refugees to escape from such a fate.”12 The reports 
only mentioned the deportations from the Reich that were not understood 
as part of a wider policy of annihilation. Moreover, important informa-
tion that circulated within Swiss territory was transmitted abroad through 
private channels, and did not reach the government. This happened with 
Gerhart Riegner, the World Jewish Congress representative in Geneva. He 
forwarded important details obtained from German industrialist Edward 
Schulze to London and Washington.13
The Swiss press was also well informed about the segregation and per-
secution of Jews. However, after the war began, censorship was imposed 
that also functioned a posteriori. This mechanism worked to avoid publica-
tion of news that could lead to protests from the belligerent countries. 
Sweden
In August 1942, Karl Vendel, the Swedish consul in Stettin, wrote a report 
recounting conversations he had had on a visit to occupied Poland in which 
he said that the Nazis’ objective was to annihilate all Jews, and that even 
those who were kept alive to fill labor shortages would be exterminated as 
soon as they were deemed no longer useful. At the end of the report, Vendel 
made a point of emphasizing that his source, of German origin, was reliable 
so that no doubts could be raised about the credibility of the information. 
This was one of the first revelations about the extermination of the Jews 
to become known in the West, and preceded both Karski’s report and the 
Riegner Cable.14
Another Swedish diplomat, Göran von Otter, revealed important 
information received from SS officer Kurt Gerstein, which was then trans-
12 Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland—Second World War. Switzer-
land. National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report. Zurich: Pendo, 
2002. 113.
13 W. Laqueur. “The Terrible Secret: Some Afterthoughts.” In C. Y. Freeze, S.F. Fried, 
E.R. Sheppard (eds.). The Individual in History: Essays in Honor of Jehuda Rein-
harz. Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2015. 409–413.
14 J. Lewandowski. “Early Swedish Information about the Nazis’ Mass Murder of the 
Jews.” Polin 13 (2000): 113–127.
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mitted to the head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s political department. 
Gerstein was returning from an inspection of the Belzec extermination 
camp where he had witnessed the killing of Jews in the gas chambers. Soon 
after, he met von Otter by chance on a train from Warsaw to Berlin. This 
was the moment he passed on information to send back to Swedish authori-
ties in Stockholm, asking that it be forwarded to the Allies. However, as 
Paul Levine has argued, we still do not know when and how von Otter 
passed the information to the Foreign Ministry. Furthermore, as Levine 
demonstrated, the Swedish government did not forward the information 
to the Allies.
The Swedish press also published news based on reports, but did so 
sporadically since the government’s “Board of Information” advised news-
paper editors not to publish anything on inopportune topics—such as 
atrocities committed by the belligerent parties—because this could be seen 
as a provocation with dangerous consequences for Sweden. Thus, it was 
only when the deportation of Jews ordered by Quisling’s collaborationist 
government in Norway caused a “great commotion,” leading the press and 
Lutheran bishops to react indignantly. For Levine, “this first shift” was “a 
response to the tragedy of the tiny population of the fellow Nordic nation 
Norway,” when the Germans were already surrounded at Stalingrad, and 
Rommel had been defeated in North Africa.15
Spain
Unlike Sweden or Switzerland, Spain had combatants fighting on the East-
ern Front. The regime was informed by soldiers from the Blue Division 
about the bloody repression to which Poles and Russians were subjected. 
These soldiers saw first-hand how the local population was discriminated 
against. However, they did not actually witness any massacres since Ein-
satzgruppe A had already carried out the “cleansing” of areas where the 
Spanish were fighting.
15 P.A. Levine. “Attitudes and Action: Comparing the Responses of Mid-Level 
Bureaucrats to the Holocaust.” in D. Cesarani and P.A. Levine (eds.). Bystanders to 
the Holocaust: A Re-Evaluation. London: Frank Cass, 2002. 226; W. Laqueur. “The 
Terrible Secret: Some Afterthoughts.” 52.
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Furthermore, Spaniards could travel to the occupied territories, as 
a delegation of doctors did when they visited Austria and Poland in late 
1941. As a result of this trip, a secret document was sent to Spain’s Interior 
Ministry that described the incarceration and killing of Jews in ghettos. 
This report probably ended up in the hands of Francisco Franco. In August 
1942, the dictator was also informed by the general-directorate of security 
of the deportations from France to Eastern Europe. In July 1943, a Span-
ish lawyer in Madrid made public the rumors he had heard in Berlin about 
how Jews were being deported and later gassed. This information came to 
the knowledge of the British Embassy in Madrid, which passed it on to the 
Foreign Office in London.16
Spain was also informed by its diplomatic representatives of the on-go-
ing antisemitic persecutions. In the case of Spain, the German ultimatum 
of January 1943 allows us to assess how much Spain actually knew about 
the Nazi genocide policy.17 In July 1943, the first secretary of the Spanish 
Embassy in Berlin spoke with German diplomat Eberhard von Thadden 
about the Spanish Jews in Salonika. The diplomat told von Thadden, who 
was responsible for implementing antisemitic policy at Germany’s Foreign 
Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), that Spain could in no way agree to having 
its subjects murdered in Polish camps. The German denied the accusa-
tion, saying the information about the atrocities was defamatory propa-
ganda generated by Germany’s enemies. Also in July, the Spanish ambas-
sador informed the Foreign Ministry of the “tragic consequences” of any 
eventual deportation of Spanish Jews. With his consent, a member of the 
embassy staff wrote a letter to a friend, the director-general of foreign pol-
icy at the Foreign Ministry, saying that should Spain refuse to receive the 
Jews, it would be condemning them “automatically to death.”18
As for the press, unlike proceedings in Sweden or Switzerland, it was 
only at the end of 1945 that ABC, a Spanish newspaper, was able to publish 
news about the Nazi camps.19
16 B. Rother. Franco y el Holocausto. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005. 125–126.
17 See the essay of Bernd Rother in this volume for discussions of this issue.
18 B. Rother. Franco y el Holocausto. 127.
19 X.M. Núñez Seixas. “Testigos o Encubridores? La División Azul y el Holocausto 
de los Judíos Europeos: Entre Historia y Memoria.” in Historia y Politica No. 26 
(2011): 265.
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Portugal
In Portugal, which had been under a dictatorial regime since 1926, the press 
was subject to censorship. With the outbreak of war this control increased 
significantly. News reports about the barbarities committed by the Ger-
mans were eliminated on the pretext that they would compromise the 
country’s official position. The censors even questioned whether the infor-
mation on the existence of concentration camps and the execution of Jews, 
Poles and Catholics by firing squads was not just propaganda and rumors.20 
These initial doubts were soon dispelled, but later the cuts were justified 
not because the information was considered imaginary, but because the 
news contained “inconvenient” details, so that information about German 
concentration and extermination camps continued to be censored.21 From 
Bucharest, the Portuguese minister, Fernando Quartin de Oliveira Bas-
tos, who had held on-going talks with the papal nuncio, kept Salazar up 
to date about the persecution set in motion by the Ion Antonescu regime. 
He even refers to “the murders that are being systematically committed in 
this country of the Jews,” and to “the pillaging and extermination of the 
Jews in occupied Russian territory.”22 However, the Polish government-in-
exile, especially through its legation in Lisbon, was the most important 
source of information for the Portuguese government. It sent the Portu-
guese government Sikorski’s speech from 9 June, 1942.23 On 22 September, 
the Polish legation in Lisbon handed a verbal note to the Portuguese gov-
ernment about the deportation of Polish Jews living in unoccupied France 
to the Reich.
20 See, for example, the article “…Piores entradas” [Bad Start to the Year]- based on 
Polish reports, which the newspaper A Voz sought to publish (Oliveira Salazar 
Archive, Lisbon (Arquivo de Oliveira Salazar, DGARQ/AOS), CO/NE2, pt.47, 
“Informações—Alemanha.” A Voz de 1-1ª”). 
21 Oliveira Salazar Archive, Lisbon, DGARQ, AOS/CO/PC-3E, pasta 28. Letter from 
M. Figueiredo to António de Oliveira Salazar about the censorship of news regard-
ing the concentration camps in Germany. 21 April 1945.
22 Telegrama No. 86. Do Ministro de Portugal em Bucareste ao Ministro dos Negó-
cios Estrangeiro, 6 Nov. 1941. Doc.2520, Dez Anos de Política Externa (1936–1947). 
A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial Vol. X (1974): 21–22.
23 All the Polish documents mentioned hereafter can be found in the Historical and 
Diplomatic Archives of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon 
(AHDMNE), Lisbon, 2.º P. Armário 49, Maço 96. 
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At the end of 1942, the Palestine-based “Representation of Polish Jewry” 
sent a telegram about the situation of the Polish Jews to the president of the 
Portuguese Republic. According to this document, thousands of Jews had 
already been killed by the Germans, who did not even spare women or 
children. They appealed to the president to “employ all [his] authority and 
influence to put an end to those unprecedented crimes and to open the 
gates of free countries to those who seek refuge from that inferno on earth.” 
In January 1943, the pamphlet “The Mass Extermination of Jews in German 
Occupied Poland” finally reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Portuguese regime did not allow the information it received to 
be made public, nor did it react to the countless official letters and appeals 
from the Polish government-in-exile. The verbal note of September 1942 
was, in fact, the only occasion on which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
took a position—not in an attempt to save the Jews, but as a way of showing 
their goodwill regarding the appeal. However, Portugal’s reaction was no 
different from the standard reaction demonstrated by both the other neu-
tral countries and the Allies. 
Turkey24 
The Polish underground resistance, as well as representatives of the Polish 
government-in-exile, also operated in Turkey. The Polish consulate in 
Istanbul, which was subordinate to the government-in-exile, published 
two papers in which the murder of Jews was reported several times. We 
can also assume that it sent the Turkish government Sikorski’s speech and 
the pamphlet “The Mass Extermination of Jews” as it did to the other neu-
tral governments. However, neutral Turkey was an important escape route 
for Jews fleeing Nazi oppression in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and, 
as a consequence, the country became a base for rescue activities carried 
out by Jewish organizations. In winter 1942–1943, at the initiative of the 
Jewish Agency, a rescue committee was established in Istanbul. Several 
other international relief organizations sent their representatives to Tur-
key, where refugees who managed to reach the country informed them 
about the conditions in the concentration camps and about Nazi Germa-
24 This section is based on the research of C. Guttstadt. The author thanks her for her 
generous assistance, including her comments on draft versions of this essay.
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ny’s murder of the Jews.25 According to Corry Guttstadt, because all such 
organizations and representatives were monitored by the police and intel-
ligence services, the information on the extermination camps also reached 
Turkish intelligence, though we do not know to what degree they passed 
the information on to the Turkish government itself. Representatives of the 
Jewish Agency even tried to pressure the authorities to change their refugee 
policy by drawing attention to the persecution of Jews.
Additionally, some reports, particularly from American journalists 
accredited in Turkey, were dispatched. For example, in 1941, journalists 
reported from Turkey about the murder of Jews by the Einsatzgruppen in 
Romania. However, this does not mean that the Turkish population knew 
about such information. At that time, Turkey was a totalitarian state and 
information was frequently silenced by restrictive laws, and censored first 
by the government’s press office, and, from 1941, also by the military com-
mander of the state of emergency. The German-Turkish Treaty of Friend-
ship and Non-Aggression of 18 June, 1941, prohibited the publication of 
any news hostile to Nazi Germany. During the early years of Nazi rule, the 
Turkish press expressed understanding for anti-Jewish laws, stating that 
this was a reaction to Jewish hegemony over Germany’s society and econ-
omy. This silence by the Turkish press was a consequence of German pres-
sure, but also of indifference to the fate of the Jews. As a result, informa-
tion about German atrocities was eliminated on the pretext that it would 
compromise Turkey’s neutrality. The December 1942 issue of the govern-
ment journal Ayın Tarihi, (“The History of the Month”), reported in Janu-
ary 1943 on the inter-Allied declaration, publishing verbatim the speech 
by British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on the destruction of European 
Jews by Nazi Germany. This is the most important evidence showing that, 
in the spring of 1943, Turkey’s government knew about “the destruction of 
the Jews in Poland.”26 From Bucharest, the Turkish ambassador, Hamdul-
lah Suphi Tanrıöver, reported on the dangers faced by the Jews in Romania. 
In other European countries, diplomats received requests for help from 
Turkish Jews who were targets of Nazi antisemitic persecution. Some of 
these were sent directly to the president or to Turkey’s Parliament.27 How-
25 T. Kollek. For Jerusalem: A Life. New York: Random House, 1978. 45–47.
26 Ayın Tarihi No. 109, December 1942: 309.
27 C. Guttstadt. Turkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust. New York: Cambridge UP, 2013. 
200ff, 268.
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ever, until the declassification and public disclosure of official Turkish doc-
uments, it is impossible to know exactly when and how information on 
Germany’s genocidal policy reached the Turkish government. 
In fact, this comparative analysis allows us to draw some important 
conclusions about the behavior of the neutral countries in light of what 
they knew about the Holocaust at the time. The amount of information 
initially available was limited and was viewed with great skepticism. Suf-
ficient information from different sources had to be accumulated in order 
for the doubts to turn into certainties. Yet even then, owing to the offi-
cial neutrality declared by these countries, “inconvenient” and “sensi-
tive” matters were avoided. Moreover, the mere fact that some diplomats 
and citizens from the neutral countries realized the dimension of Ger-
man crimes does not mean that their governments believed their reports. 
Again, available information was not always fully comprehended or trans-
formed into knowledge, regardless of whether the country was a democ-
racy or dictatorship. In the case of Switzerland and Sweden, there were 
fears of triggering a negative German reaction. When they began receiv-
ing information about the murders, there was no guarantee that Germany 
would lose the war, and there remained the real possibility of invasion. 
Priority was given to maintaining cordial relations with all the countries 
at war, thereby guaranteeing their neutrality. They were also not inter-
ested in transforming their countries into lands of refuge by opening their 
borders and allowing thousands of refugees to enter, people who could 
not return to their countries of origin. Feelings of sympathy for the perse-
cuted minority rarely emerged among the non-belligerent governments, 
not even a feeling of solidarity. On the contrary, immigration policies 
became tougher with major obstacles being put in place to prevent peo-
ple from obtaining visas in order to stop refugees from entering their ter-
ritories. In reality, political leaders felt no empathy with the Jews and, in 
some cases, antisemitic prejudice among some mid-level bureaucrats was 
evident even when antisemitism was not a key element in the regimes’ 
political ideologies. For dictatorial governments like those of Franco or 
Salazar, it was unthinkable to embrace a humanitarian mission for indi-
viduals who were not national citizens but foreigners, and for whom they 
had no legal responsibility whatsoever. The indifference towards the mur-
derous drama taking place beyond their borders was generalized, some-
thing which only changed at the end of the war, when the outcome was 
definitively decided.
wHat waS known in tHe neutral countrieS 
ihra_bystanders__innen_druck.indd   137 25.02.2016   21:22:30
